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“Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative 
process . . . .”1 
The history of administrative law in the United States 
constitutes a series of ongoing attempts to legitimize unelected 
public administration in a constitutional liberal democracy.2  It is a 
history of many twists and turns in which public administration and 
understandings of its legitimacy have coevolved.3  It is also a history 
that took a very wrong turn with what Richard Stewart described in 
1975 as a “reformation” in the subject.4  The reformation provided a 
“surrogate political process,” one that was intended to ensure a “fair 
representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of 
administrative decision.”5  Even at the time, Professor Stewart was 
skeptical the reformation could effectuate an interest-group process 
that produced “outcomes that better serve society as a whole.”6  In 
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 1. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962). 
 2. See generally BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: 
RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
(1996); JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A 
CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986); STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982). 
 3. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (describing four theories that fail to overcome 
the problems of managerial domination and personal alienation in corporate 
and administrative agencies). 
 4. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669 (1975). 
 5. Id. at 1670. 
 6. Id. at 1760. 
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this he was prescient.  Empirical evidence indicates that industry 
interests dominate the rulemaking process in a number of important 
areas of social regulation, with no public interest representation at 
all in many rulemakings.7 
The reformation was an effort to strengthen the relationship 
between administrative law, accountability, and legitimacy 
following a basic model later dubbed the “rational-instrumental” 
paradigm.8  Under this model, agency accountability is ensured by 
deploying various external scientific, technical, and legal oversight 
processes to prevent agency staff from exercising discretion.  Besides 
failing at its own goal, however, the reformation and the rational-
instrumental reforms that have followed it have had four adverse 
consequences for public administration. 
First, this discretion-free or rational-instrumental paradigm 
treats public administration as a simple agent of the legislature, 
rather than a substantive institution in its own right, even though 
this understanding has always been at odds with regulatory and 
legislative realities.  Nevertheless, procedure after procedure has 
been added in a vain effort to eliminate discretion.  The result has 
been the ossification of rulemaking to the point where important 
and controversial rules usually take five or more years to make and 
sometimes even a decade or longer.9 
Second, and less noticed, has been the impact on public 
administration.  Because the rational-instrumental paradigm 
refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of administrative discretion, 
it facilitates the bureaucracy bashing that is all too common in the 
political system.  The result is that we have made it unattractive for 
the very professionals who are necessary for public administration 
to want to work for the government.10 
Third, the rational-instrumental paradigm has resulted in a 
distinction being drawn between the scientific and participatory 
aspects of administrative decision making.  Not only is this 
dichotomy a false one, it has undermined regulatory science in a 
number of ways, including hiding the dangers involved in the 
interaction between science and interest representation.11  It has 
also resulted in both expertise and participation being treated as 
monolithic concepts when in fact there are many different versions 
of each.  Administrative law scholars’ understandings about the 
nature and potentialities of the administrative state have therefore 
been unduly narrowed. 
 
 7. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 8. ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 27 (2007). 
 9. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 118 and 120 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the focus on the rational-instrumental paradigm has 
deflected attention away from the deliberative-constitutive 
paradigm, which dates back to at least the Progressive Era and has 
greatly influenced the development of public administration.  This 
paradigm relies on expertise, deliberation, and reason giving to 
establish the legitimacy of public administration. 
For enlightenment, administrative law must develop “a 
constitutional design that accepts the need for supplementary 
bureaucratic lawmaking in the ongoing regulatory enterprise but 
self-consciously confronts the serious legitimization problems 
involved.”12  Scholars and lawyers must broaden their intellectual 
and conceptual vision.  Enlightenment requires recognition of the 
role of expertise and discursive decision making in the legitimization 
of administrative discretion.  To put the matter a different way, we 
need to look inside the agency for administrative legitimacy. 
Contemporary administrative law scholarship and practice is so 
deeply enmeshed in rational-instrumental accountability that it is 
difficult for administrative lawyers to imagine that there is a 
complementary approach to legitimacy.  Yet, the history of 
administrative law, in this and other jurisdictions, highlights the 
significance of the deliberative-constitutive paradigm.13  The 
deliberative-constitutive paradigm embraces, rather than rejects, 
the professionalism of agency staff; agency professionalism is viewed 
as a positive attribute that helps ensure the integration of technical 
expertise in rulemaking and serves as a buffer against undue 
influence by highly interested stakeholders.  Indeed, in light of the 
demise of interest-group pluralism in rulemaking and the scholarly 
dead end in which we find ourselves, it is time to recognize and 
develop the deliberative-instrumental paradigm. 
Our case for looking inside the agency for legitimacy proceeds in 
five steps.  Part I introduces the concept of “administrative 
constitutionalism,” which encompasses the debate over what should 
be the role and nature of public administration to ensure its 
legitimacy.  It then lays out the elements of the rational-
instrumental and deliberative-constitutive paradigms and explains 
how they contribute to administrative constitutionalism respectively 
from the outside-in and the inside-out.  Part II provides a brief 
history of administrative constitutionalism, which reveals there 
have been ongoing tensions between two paradigms—and thus 
between outside-in and inside-out accountability—since the 1880s.  
Part III elaborates on our argument that the current emphasis on 
the rational-instrumental model has made administrative 
 
 12. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
633, 696 (2000). 
 13. FISHER, supra note 8, at 30.  For a similar discussion, see also CAROL 
HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ch.1 (2009). 
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constitutionalism unsustainable.  Part IV argues that 
acknowledging and developing the deliberative-constitutive 
paradigm will strengthen administrative constitutionalism by 
admitting the existence of agency discretion and by looking for 
realistic ways to make it accountable.  Finally, Part V offers a case 
study in how the deliberative-constitutive paradigm can contribute 
to administrative constitutionalism. 
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The history of administrative law in the United States has been 
a continuing effort to fit the “‘round peg’ of administrative 
government into the ‘square hole’ of the nation’s constitutional 
culture.”14  In this history we see continuous debates over what 
should be the role and nature of public administration so as to 
ensure it is legitimate—a discourse Elizabeth Fisher describes as 
“administrative constitutionalism.”15  Legitimacy is a notoriously 
treacherous concept.  Here, we use it to refer to procedural concepts 
that have the quality of “worthiness to be recognized”16 within a 
polity committed to liberal constitutional democracy. 
Therein lies the dilemma.  While constitutional principles, such 
as the rule of law and the separation of powers, are relevant in 
thinking about the role and nature of public administration, they 
are wholly inadequate by themselves to address, in full, the issue of 
how unelected administrative power should be constituted and 
limited.  In these circumstances, what has emerged is a debate that 
is semiautonomous from constitutional law over the role and nature 
of public administration.  Administrative constitutionalism is about 
the normative nature of law and different understandings of 
 
 14. Sidney A. Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, in ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP: THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2, 3 (2005) 
[hereinafter Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=653784 . 
 15. FISHER, supra note 8, at 3.  Eskridge and Ferejohn also refer to 
“administrative constitutionalism,” but they are referring to the body of 
fundamental public law principles developed by the legislature and executive.  
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 24–26 (2010).  While we understand our concept and 
theirs to be overlapping, our focus is upon the constituting and limiting of 
administrative institutions.  For further discussion, see FISHER, supra note 8, at 
ch. 1. 
 16. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 
178–79 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979). 
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administrative legitimacy.17  As such, it is an “essentially contested 
concept,” akin to concepts such as democracy and the rule of law.18 
Two different paradigms have fed the debate over 
administrative legitimacy.  By paradigms, we mean “descriptions of 
how our political world is organized and how it works.”19  Each 
paradigm manifests a different understanding of accountability.  A 
rational-instrumental paradigm underlies outside-in 
accountability,20 while a deliberative-constitutive paradigm 
underlies inside-out accountability.  This Part describes the two 
paradigms and how the conception of the role of administrative law 
is different under each. 
A. The Rational-Instrumental Paradigm and Outside-In 
Accountability 
The rational-instrumental paradigm envisions a Weberian 
bureaucracy, which is expected to implement, but not to develop, 
government policy and values.21  For Weber, the essence of the 
bureaucratic organization was its capacity to rationally pursue its 
intended purposes, its “purposive-rationality.”22  In public 
administration, the Weberian bureaucracy serves as a “transmission 
belt” for legislative decisions23—an instrument of the legislature 
whose task is strictly to obey the preordained democratic will as it is 
expressed in legislation. 
The rational-instrumental paradigm looks to three institutional 
elements to limit the discretion of public administration.  First, legal 
frameworks of scientific and social-scientific methodologies are used 
to police administrative discretion.  These frameworks are 
 
 17. See Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytical Framework, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOMOS XX, at 189 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman 
eds., 1979) (noting that constitutionalism is a “cloudy” concept). 
 18. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 184 (1956); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an 
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 139–40 (2002). 
 19. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 1 (1997).  Paradigms “give us mental images of 
what to look for in political life and what to expect from it . . . .  [T]he influence 
of pictures or themes is not just on what we expect and what we see, but also on 
what we demand or affirm.”  Id. 
 20. Elements of the rational-instrumental paradigm and outside-in 
accountability can be found in various accounts of the administrative process.  
See, e.g., COOK, supra note 2, at 4–5 (instrumental model); THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN 
THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 3–16 (1991) (comprehensive analytical rationality); 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 67–91 
(1968) (synoptic model); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1779 (interest-group 
pluralism). 
 21. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 957–59 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1991). 
 22. See MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY ch. 7 (1991). 
 23. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1675. 
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understood to “guide discretion and allow it to be easily assessed.”24  
The expectation is that by objectifying decision making, these 
methodologies “will act as a constraint on administrative 
discretion.”25 
Second, a fair, pluralistic participatory process is employed to 
the extent that an agency confronts policy issues for which there are 
no objective resolutions because value choices are involved.26  The 
goal, however, remains the same—it is to eliminate administrative 
discretion.  As Fisher has pointed out, interest-group pluralism “is a 
way of gaining an account of the ‘will of the people’ and the role of 
the [agency] is simply to be an umpire overseeing the process.”27  As 
a surrogate legislative process, interest-group pluralism is “also a 
way of gaining a more accurate understanding of how a prescription 
should apply in a certain circumstance.”28  That is, like the 
employment of rational decision-making methodologies, public 
participation identifies appropriate resolutions of the questions 
presented, thereby removing agency discretion to decide on a 
resolution. 
Third, strict political oversight and judicial review is used to 
connect the regulatory process to representative democracy.  While 
bureaucracy may be necessary to effectuate government, the 
paradigm relies on outside-in accountability to ensure discretion is 
controlled by democratic elements in the government or is controlled 
through processes that enforce that democratic will. 
Political oversight reduces administrative discretion by giving 
elected leaders more influence over agency decision making, thereby 
establishing what Emmette Redford described many years ago as 
“overhead democracy.”29  Under this familiar concept, the public 
chooses its leaders in competitive elections; the leaders assume 
office with the power and responsibility to enact and execute policy, 
including overseeing the bureaucracy; successful leaders are 
rewarded with reelection, thereby ratifying their actions, including 
the oversight of agencies; and unsuccessful leaders are replaced.30 
Judicial review reduces administrative discretion by verifying 
that public administration has in fact been an instrument of 
legislative will, as it is expressed in the agency’s mandate.  Judges 
determine whether an agency has chosen a policy that is within its 
 
 24. FISHER, supra note 8, at 28. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 28–29. 
 27. Id. at 29. 
 28. Id. 
 29. EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 70 
(Roscoe C. Martin ed., 1969). 
 30. See KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC STATE: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 6 (2006) (describing the 
operation of overhead democracy). 
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legal discretion (defined in terms of analysis), whether the decision 
is a rational interpretation of its statutory mandate, and whether 
the agency has followed applicable administrative procedures.31  
This last function is in aid of the rational-instrumental paradigm 
because it ensures that agencies cannot ignore their legal 
obligations to rationalize decision making, and, where this is not 
possible, judicial review ensures that agencies have also paid 
attention to interest-group pluralism. 
B. The Deliberative-Constitutive Paradigm and Inside-Out 
Accountability 
The deliberative-constitutive paradigm rejects the basic premise 
of the rational-instrumental paradigm.  In recognition of the factual 
and normative complexities of administrative decision making, it 
grants to public administration substantial and ongoing problem-
solving discretion.  Under this paradigm, legislation is understood to 
set out a series of general principles and parameters for the exercise 
of discretion.32  Public administration is therefore not an “agent” of 
the legislature but instead is an institution constituted by the 
legislature to use its best judgment.33 
The paradigm accepts administrative discretion both as 
unavoidable and as necessary.  Discretion is unavoidable because 
the methodologies of the rational-instrumental model cannot 
eliminate it, as much as the proponents of the paradigm might try to 
do so.  Given this reality, the paradigm seeks to make a virtue of 
necessity.  It employs administrative expertise, deliberation, and 
reason giving to reach appropriate decisions. 
Moreover, the paradigm rests on an understanding that legally 
imposed frameworks of scientific and social-scientific methodologies 
do not make decision making “objective” in practice.  These 
methodologies, particularly cost-benefit analysis, have not displaced 
the operation of politics.  They also lack accuracy and are subject to 
being manipulated according to an analyst’s policy preference.34  
Moreover, claims about objectivity are simply untenable in light of 
post-empiricism.  Economics and other social sciences at best are a 
mixture of empirical data and social construction.35  Postempiricism 
acknowledges that science and social science can be important 
sources of knowledge, but the limits of these disciplines must be 
 
 31. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the 
Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 584 (2011). 
 32. FISHER, supra note 8, at 30. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 450–59 
(2008). 
 35. Id. at 460–62. 
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recognized.  Following on from this, experts are not limited to 
persons trained in scientific methodologies but include other 
professionals, particularly lawyers and public administrators, who 
rely on qualitative analysis to identify and justify regulatory 
solutions.  As discussed below, professionalism has an important 
role in the operation of expertise and the application of specialist 
knowledge. 
This paradigm also understands its role regarding the public 
differently.  The job of public administration is not limited to 
aggregating the preferences of interest groups when normative 
issues present themselves.  Instead, as Brian Cook points out, public 
administration must be a “political institution” that “help[s] to 
create, to express, and to realize a nation’s public purposes.”36 
Having constituted public administration as responsible for 
resolving discretionary issues, the paradigm looks to deliberation 
and reason giving as the modes of collective problem solving.  
Deliberation is the means by which regulatory issues are defined, 
the relevance of information and expertise is established, and 
potential solutions are vetted.  It can involve a wide array of actors 
or a small group, depending on the problem at hand. 
Unlike the reliance of social science methodologies on revealed 
preferences, this paradigm does not understand individual 
preferences to be given.  A deliberative dialogue is transformative in 
nature because different actors can learn from the process and 
reconsider their perspectives.  This approach also maintains that 
dialogue and deliberation must be “insulated from the mainstream 
political process, which is over-responsive to particular political 
interests.”37  Finally, public administration is responsible for 
informing and directing deliberations as well as for making the final 
decision. 
The deliberative-constitutive paradigm manifests itself in terms 
of inside-out accountability.  Or, to put the matter another way, it 
looks to the elements of the paradigm—substantive expertise, 
deliberation, and reason giving—as ways of legitimizing public 
administration.  Thus, inside-out accountability legitimizes public 
administration by fulfilling the constituent role that public 
administration has been assigned.38 
Inside-out accountability rests on the potential of organizational 
culture to promote among civil servants a mission orientation, a 
sense of public service, and professionalism.39  The first two norms 
establish and reinforce the “other-regarding” motives of civil 
 
 36. COOK, supra note 2, at 16. 
 37. FISHER, supra note 8, at 31. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public 
Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 229 
(1987). 
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servants, making them less likely to engage in self-interested 
behavior that sabotages the public interest mission of their agency.40  
This reduces the risk that allowing for administrative discretion will 
reduce democratic responsiveness.41 
The last norm, professionalism, creates administrative 
legitimacy by promoting neutral (as distinct from objective) 
expertise, in which scientists, lawyers, and other professionals 
present to political appointees the scientific, policy, and legal options 
relevant to the decisions that the administrators must make.42  It 
also means these civic servants will carry out the preferences of 
political appointees once these are made known.43 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
We do not contend that the deliberative-constitutive paradigm 
and inside-out accountability are “the answer” but instead that 
there has been a failure to recognize the significance of this 
approach to addressing the contemporary legitimacy problems of 
American administrative law.  The recognition of both paradigms in 
administrative scholarship and practice would ensure that 
administrative constitutionalism reflects all of the different 
possibilities relating to the role and nature of public administration.  
As a result, debates over accountability would become more nuanced 
and textured.44 
For this purpose, we turn to a history of administrative 
constitutionalism, which reveals the influence of both paradigms on 
public administration.  This history may be familiar, but we briefly 
focus on it because it reveals an ongoing debate between the two 
paradigms.  As we noted earlier, administrative constitutionalism is 
a contested concept.  This has been true since the beginning of the 
administrative state, and it remains true today. 
A. In the Beginning 
The earliest regulatory agencies adopted new policies through 
the use of administrative trials, which had most of the elements of a 
common law trial except a jury.45  The Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”), for example, used trial-like adjudicatory 
procedures to set railroad rates, and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) used these procedures to determine if an unfair or deceptive 
 
 40. See infra notes 152–64 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra notes 152–64 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 140–51 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 44. Elizabeth Fisher, The European Union in the Age of Accountability, 24 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 497–98 (2004). 
 45. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the 
Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 477 (2003). 
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trade practice had occurred.46  This makes the ICC and the FTC the 
earliest manifestations of the rational-instrumental paradigm, but it 
quickly became apparent that regulators were also required to 
exercise discretion grounded in experience and professionalism.  For 
example, in reviewing an ICC decision, Justice Holmes noted: 
But the action does not appear to have been arbitrary except 
in the sense in which many honest and sensible judgments are 
so.  They express an intuition of experience which out-runs 
analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled 
impressions,—impressions which may lie beneath 
consciousness without losing their worth.  The board was 
created for the purpose of using its judgment and its 
knowledge.47 
B. The Progressives 
Despite reliance on administrative trials, the Progressive 
Movement sought to develop administrative institutions on the basis 
of the deliberative-constitutive paradigm.  In 1887, Woodrow Wilson 
proposed a “science of administration” that would operate “outside 
the proper sphere of politics.”48  We will have more to say about 
Wilson’s aspirations in Part IV.  For now, we note that the 
Pendleton Civic Service Act of 1883, an early Progressive victory, 
reflected the goal of a nonpartisan, expert bureaucracy.49 
In the New Deal, the deliberative-constitutive paradigm had as 
much, or perhaps even more, influence than its rational-
instrumental counterpart.  Legislation such as the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) adopted procedures far less formal 
than the administrative trial model.50  New Dealers, such as 
Thurmond Arnold, justified the lack of administrative procedures on 
the ground that traditional procedural concepts were outmoded and 
counterproductive.51  They believed that “[m]odern regulatory 
statutes can provide no more than the skeleton, and must leave to 
administrative bodies the addition of flesh and blood necessary for a 
living body.”52 
 
 46. See id. at 475. 
 47. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 
(1907). 
 48. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 56 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 494 
(1941). 
 49. Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 AM. HIST. 
REV. 301, 315–16 (1959). 
 50. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of 
Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1997). 
 51. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 372–75 (1937). 
 52. Walter F. Dodd, Administrative Agencies as Legislators and Judges, 25 
A.B.A. J. 923, 925 (1939). 
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When progressives sought to reconcile democracy and expertise, 
they turned to deliberation as the methodology.53  John Dewey, for 
example, took his inspiration from the scientific method, with its 
emphasis on critical thinking, experimentation, and ongoing debate, 
and he argued that democratic process should reflect the same 
principles.54  Thus, while expertise was necessary to bring about 
social change, the expectation was that there would be an ongoing 
debate and consultation concerning the creation and 
implementation of policy.55  Following Dewey, Felix Frankfurter 
argued that commissions of inquiry were important vehicles for 
“defining issues, sifting evidence, posing problems and enlightening 
the public mind.”56 
Similarly, the founders of the field of “public policy analysis,” 
Harold Lasswell, Yehezkel Dror, and others, were advocates of a 
deliberative-constitutive approach.57  They argued that analysis 
should study both how policy decisions are reached and what 
constitutes good public policy, with the goal of improving both 
process and substance.58  The analysis would be normative because 
the goal was to improve the practice of democracy and to better 
society, not merely to produce new knowledge.59  According to Dror, 
“[t]he main test of policy science is better policymaking, which 
produces better policies; these, in turn, are defined as policies which 
provide increased achievement of goals that are preferred after 
careful consideration.”60  As such, the intention was that policy 
science would inform both citizens and governmental officials, and 
would therefore serve as a bridge between professionals and 
democracy.61 
 
 53. HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 400 (1914); WALTER 
LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST, 
at xviii–xix (1914); see also CHARLES FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM: 
CROLY, WEYL, LIPPMANN, AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900–1925, at 156 (1961), 
available at http://www.archive.org/stream/crossroadsoflibe007335mbp 
/crossroadsoflibe007335mbp_djvu.txt. 
 54. Joseph G. Metz, Democracy and the Scientific Method in the Philosophy 
of John Dewey, 31 REV. POL. 242, 242 (1969). 
 55. Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, supra note 14, at 4. 
 56. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 162–63 (1930). 
 57. See, e.g., YEHEZKEL DROR, DESIGN FOR POLICY SCIENCES 51 (1971); 
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 1 (1971). 
 58. PETER DELEON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 
SCIENCES 29 (1988) (noting that Lasswell and others were interested in both 
“knowledge of and in the policy process”). 
 59. LASSWELL, supra note 57, at 3–4. 
 60. DROR, supra note 57, at 51. 
 61. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 34, at 438. 
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C. The Administrative Procedure Act 
In 1947, Congress passed the current Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”),62 which reflects both paradigms.  While the APA relies 
on legal procedures to check administrative power, it also reflects 
the Progressives’ understanding that rigid legal procedures slowed 
government action and were unnecessary.  The compromise can be 
seen in two key features of the APA.  First, the APA establishes 
rulemaking as an alternative to adjudication for many 
administrative decisions, permitting agencies to promulgate rules 
for entire industries or groups of regulated entities and to do so with 
a procedural framework designed to promote deliberation rather 
than simply constraining discretion.63  Second, the APA permits 
varying degrees of procedural formality for both adjudication and 
rulemaking.64  Further, formal trial-like procedures are only 
required for these functions if Congress requires such procedures in 
the agency’s statutory mandate.65  For the most part, Congress has 
not required the use of formal procedures for either rulemaking or 
adjudication.66  Moreover, judicial review doctrine was reshaped on 
this basis—different grounds of review being deployed in relation to 
different rulemaking processes.67 
D. The Reformation 
Between 1965 and 1975, public interest advocates were 
concerned that the many legislative victories they won in Congress 
would be lost in the halls of the agencies.68  Their concerns reflected 
a general disillusionment with the deliberative-constitutive 
paradigm that could be seen in reports and scholarship that 
highlighted problems of inefficiency, poorly trained personnel, and 
agency inertia.69  For the public interest movement, this suggested 
 
 62. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2006). 
 63. Id. § 553. 
 64. Id. §§ 553–554. 
 65. Id. § 554(a). 
 66. Id. §§ 553–554. 
 67. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of 
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 382–84 (1974). 
 68. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND 
PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 5 (1982) (noting that Congress passed 
twenty-five laws regulating the business community between 1967 and 1973). 
 69. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 
(1969) (claiming the FTC had failed to achieve the goals of its designers); 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27, 54–
55 (1969) (arguing that unchecked and uncontrolled discretion was not 
desirable and that there was a greater need for clear rules); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, 
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF 
STANDARDS 2 (1962) (characterizing federal regulation as a “Serbonian bog”); 
JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 11–
15 (1960) (discussing problems of unethical conduct and institutional inertia 
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that administrative discretion invited corporate capture.70  The 
same conclusion was suggested by a number of revisionist histories, 
which argued that New Deal concepts of expertise merely shrouded 
agency capture and perpetuated maintenance of the status quo.71 
The public interest movement turned to the courts to head off 
regulatory capture, and judges responded with the reformation, 
which empowered public interest groups to hold agencies 
accountable.72  What Stewart described as the “reformation” of 
American administrative law was part of this process.73  For their 
part, judges adopted the rational-instrumental understanding of 
interest representation pluralism.  The deliberative-constitutive 
model did indeed have its flaws; however, the response was not to 
recognize those flaws and see if they could be repaired but instead to 
shift understandings of the role and nature of public administration 
to the rational-instrumental paradigm.74  This was therefore an act 
of throwing the baby out with the dirty bathwater. 
E. Counterreformation 
Beginning in 1980, the reformation was followed by what 
Shapiro has described as a “counter-reformation.”75  Once again, the 
goal was to reduce administrative discretion, but this time 
discretion was reduced using administrative, executive, and 
judicially imposed analytical requirements.76  Reformers pointed to 
a series of studies purporting to show that health, safety, and 
environmental regulations produced costs considerably in excess of 
regulatory benefits.77  They also believed that the government was 
overly responsive to irrational public demands for protection against 
health, safety, and environmental risks—demands that were 
inconsistent with expert judgments about the extent of those risks.78 
Reflecting these understandings, the White House and Congress 
imposed numerous regulatory impact analysis requirements 
 
and touching on problems of delay and the deterioration in the quality of 
personnel). 
 70. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 44 (1986) (discussing the distrust of discretion in 
the public interest movement). 
 71. See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 270–71 (1955); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–
1916, at 2 (1965). 
 72. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: 
Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 694–95 
(2000) [hereinafter Shapiro, Counter-Reformation]. 
 73. Id. at 692. 
 74. Id. at 706. 
 75. Id. at 697. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 697–98. 
 78. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAW OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 126–27 (2005). 
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intended to require comprehensive and analytical decision making.79  
In addition, the White House has escalated its control over agency 
government.80  It has sought to strengthen overhead democracy by 
increasing the number of political appointees in agencies.81  It has 
also required agencies to submit their significant rules and 
accompanying cost-benefit studies to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for approval in an effort to reduce 
discretion.82 
III.  THE UNSUSTAINABLE STATE OF CONTEMPORARY  
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
There has been a decisive turn toward the rational-
instrumental paradigm and outside-in accountability in the history 
of debates over administrative constitutionalism.  Despite its 
current popularity, this approach has left us with an understanding 
of administrative constitutionalism that is both incomplete and 
unsustainable.  For one thing, we can no longer depend, if we ever 
could, on interest-group pluralism to counter the disproportionate 
influence of regulatory entities over agency policy making.  This 
conclusion is highlighted by other articles in this special issue. 
But this is not all.  The rational-instrumental paradigm has 
always been at odds with the regulatory and legislative reality of the 
administrative state.  Ignoring this dissonance weakens efforts to 
legitimize public administration, allowing for the demonization of 
bureaucrats and the defunding of agencies.  The turn toward the 
rational-instrumental paradigm has also resulted in a distinction 
being drawn between the scientific and participatory aspects of 
administrative decision making, a false dichotomy that has 
permitted the undermining of regulatory science.  Lastly, the 
preoccupation with the rational-instrumental paradigm has stunted 
thinking about how to develop inside-out accountability, a move that 
would allow us to offset some of the weaknesses of outside-in 
accountability. 
A. Rulemaking Without Pluralism 
Empirical studies reveal that industry dominates the 
rulemaking process, both at agencies and at OIRA—a result that 
contradicts the premise of the reformation.  This dominance biases 
rulemaking and subverts judicial review. 
 
 79. See MCGARITY, supra note 20, at xiv–xv, 19–21.  See Shapiro, Counter-
Reformation, supra note 72, at 707–09 (describing the impact analysis 
requirements). 
 80. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2246 (2001). 
 81. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 604–08 (documenting the 
increase in political appointees). 
 82. Id. at 583. 
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1. Rulemaking 
Studies have found that business interests dominate 
rulemaking, whether measured by the number of rulemakings in 
which various interests filed comments or the relative number of 
comments that were filed in individual rulemakings.83  Wagner and 
her coauthors confirmed these results in a study of ninety hazardous 
air pollutant rulemakings at the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”).84  On average, industry filed over 81% of the comments 
submitted concerning a proposed rule;85 public interest groups filed 
comments in less than 50% of the rulemakings;86 and industry 
interests had an average of at least 170 times more communications 
with EPA staff (meetings, phone calls, letters, etc.) than did public 
interest groups during the period before the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (pre-NPRM period).87 
The same study found that the EPA mostly changed rules in the 
direction favored by industry.88  Other studies have found a similar 
result,89 but there are also studies that have not found a connection 
between industry dominance and changes favorable to industry.90  
Still, it is difficult to believe that business does not get an advantage 
from this asymmetry.  For years, knowledgeable observers have 
contended that asymmetrical information produces agency 
capture,91 and this propensity is explained by the psychological 
literature.92 
Furthermore, and even more ironically, the reformation has 
contributed to industry bias in rulemaking.  Because the courts 
 
 83. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: 
Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 226 
nn.16–17 (2012) [hereinafter Shapiro, Complexity of Capture] (describing 
studies of industry dominance). 
 84. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of 
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 119 (2011). 
 85. Id. at 128–29.  The number of industry comments also greatly 
outnumbered public interest comments for those rules where there were public 
interest comments.  Industry filed an average of 35 comments per rule, while 
public interest groups filed an average of 2.4 comments per rule.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 128. 
 87. Id. at 125.  Industry interests had an average of 84 contacts per rule as 
compared to an average of 0.7 contacts for public interest groups.  Id. 
 88. Comments raised an average of 22 significant issues in each 
rulemaking, and EPA on average made changes to the final rule concerning 
about one-half of these issues.  Of the changes made, 83% of them weakened the 
rule in some manner.  Id. at 130. 
 89. See Shapiro, Complexity of Capture, supra note 83, at 239 n.82 
(describing the studies that reached a similar result). 
 90. Id. at 240 n.85 (describing the studies). 
 91. Id. at 241 (noting comments of observers). 
 92. Id. at 238 (discussing psychological tendencies). 
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expect an agency to respond to all significant comments,93 the 
agency cannot “shield itself from this flood of information and focus 
on developing its own expert conception of the project.”94  This 
presents a problem of “filter failure” in which asymmetrical 
information overwhelms the agency and influences the outcome.95 
2. OIRA 
OIRA oversight reinforces or even exacerbates existing 
pluralistic imbalances.  Rena Steinzor and her coauthors from the 
Center of Progressive Reform (“CPR”) found that 65% of the 
participants in 1080 meetings at OIRA were from industry interests, 
which was five times the number of attendees who represented 
public interest groups.96  An overwhelming number of the lawyers 
(nearly 95%), consultants, and lobbyists who attended these 
meetings represented business interests as compared to 2.5% who 
represented public interest groups.97  OIRA was also much more 
likely to meet alone with industry interests than with public 
interests.  Seventy-three percent of the more than 1000 meetings 
involved only industry interests, while a mere 7% involved only 
public interests.98 
We know that OIRA habitually opposes stringent regulation,99 
although analysts have failed to provide empirical evidence linking 
this bias to industry dominance of White House meetings.100  This 
leads some analysts to doubt that the White House uses the review 
process to deliver benefits to powerful interests,101 but we are less 
sanguine.  The countless meetings between industry interests and 
OIRA undoubtedly are about regulatory costs, and the public 
 
 93. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 245 
(2d Cir. 1977) (reversing an FDA regulation governing good practices for 
whitefish in part because the FDA failed to respond to an important technical 
comment in its final rule); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an “agency must 
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action”). 
 94. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010). 
 95. Id. at 1328. 
 96. Shapiro, Complexity of Capture, supra note 83, at 236–37. 
 97. Id. at 237. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 34, at 450–51 (discussing evidence 
of OMB bias). 
 100. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 877, 858–60 (2003) (finding that 
OIRA sought changes in politically controversial rules, but finding that the type 
of interest group that attended a meeting with OIRA officials did not predict 
whether OIRA would change the rule or accept it as is). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 858–60. 
W03_SFW(DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2012  10:06 AM 
2012] ENLIGHTENMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 479 
interest community lacks an equal opportunity to focus OIRA on 
regulatory benefits.102 
3. Judicial Review 
Beyond the problem of biasing the agency, the lack of public 
interest involvement adversely affects judicial review, particularly 
when that involvement reflects the wide dominance of the rational-
instrumental paradigm.  The reformation presumed public interest 
groups would put information in the record that supported the 
public’s interest in strong regulation, and that they could then hold 
an agency accountable in court if it ignored that evidence.103  
Moreover, because an agency would know that it was vulnerable if it 
did not account for this evidence, a public interest group would have 
leverage to lobby the agency for stronger regulation.104  Obviously, 
both of these advantages are lost to the extent that no public 
interest group appears to file comments.105 
Even if a public interest group files comments, it is still 
disadvantaged by the overwhelming number of industry comments.  
Industry interests have been able to turn the requirement that 
agencies respond to all significant comments to their favor.  By filing 
so many comments, industry interests can use a blunderbuss attack 
during judicial review, which accuses the agency of neglecting their 
point of view because it failed to respond to some of the many 
comments that were filed.106  This gives rise to judicial review 
strategies driven by “analytical opportunism.”107 
B. Catch-22 
An administrative constitutionalism rooted in the rational-
instrumental paradigm cannot deliver true outside-in accountability 
if there is disproportionate industry influence, which there appears 
to be.  The rational-instrumental paradigm has another weakness 
that prevents it from successfully legitimizing agency government.  
It aspires to provide regulatory government without bureaucratic 
discretion, although it cannot deliver on that promise.  Yet, without 
delivering on that promise, the paradigm cannot legitimize public 
administration.  This failure invites more efforts to control 
 
 102. See Shapiro, Complexity of Capture, supra note 83, at 240–41 (noting 
that industry lobbying tends to confirm an overemphasis on costs among OIRA 
analysts). 
 103. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1761. 
 104. Shapiro, Complexity of Capture, supra note 83, at 226. 
 105. Also, public interest groups have been adversely affected by the 
Supreme Court’s more restrictive standing doctrine, which disables them from 
appealing some agency rules.  See Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 72, 
at 717–20 (describing standing restrictions). 
 106. Wagner, supra note 94, at 1325, 1339, 1352–54, 1364. 
 107. FISHER, supra note 8, at 89–124. 
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administration from the outside, which further slows the 
administrative process, prevents it from accomplishing its purposes, 
and brings little or no additional accountability.  This failure also 
leads to political demonizing of the bureaucracy, making it more 
difficult to recruit the professional expertise necessary to make 
public administration work.108 
1. Bracketing Discretion 
Any realistic assessment demonstrates the inability of outside-
in accountability to drain administrative discretion from the system.  
Political oversight is unsystematic and ineffective, among numerous 
other weaknesses.109  As discussed earlier, analytical methodologies 
imposed from the outside are often unreliable in specific contexts 
and subject to manipulation.110  Judicial review is supposed to be 
deferential because unelected federal judges should not be 
influencing regulatory policies, an admonition that, if heeded, limits 
the extent to which judicial review can limit administrative 
discretion.  Judicial review has become less deferential since the 
reformation, but ultimately generalist judges are limited in second-
guessing agency judgments because of institutional competence.111 
In short, the rational-instrumental paradigm in practice 
brackets administrative discretion, reducing an agency’s discretion 
to some extent.  Clearly, agencies have less discretion than they 
would have otherwise if there were no presidential and legislative 
oversight and judicial review.  But, just as clearly, the rational-
instrumental paradigm does not eliminate significant sources of 
agency discretion.  How much discretion exists varies from agency to 
agency, and even rule to rule, but no agency operates simply as a 
transmission belt for legislative directives.  The model has failed to 
fulfill its promise of largely discretion-free administrative law.   
2. Dismantling Administrative Capacity 
As Abraham Maslow has pointed out, “it is tempting, if the only 
tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a 
nail.”112  Ignoring the potential of inside-out accountability, 
 
 108. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE 
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, 
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 126–29 (2010) (noting 
the almost universal tendency of presidents and other elected officials to engage 
in “bureaucracy bashing”). 
 109. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 581–85 (noting weaknesses of 
political oversight); id. at 608–17 (discussing weaknesses of White House 
oversight). 
 110. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 584–85 (discussing weaknesses 
of judicial review). 
 112. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE 
15–16 (1966). 
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administrative reformers keep returning to the rational-
instrumental paradigm to address the discretion that the previous 
set of reforms did not eliminate.  The result has not only led to the 
ossification of rulemaking,113 but it has further weakened the 
legitimacy of public administration.  As agencies flounder in their 
efforts to address pressing regulatory problems, the perceived 
legitimacy of public administration declines even more.  After all, 
the legitimacy of the regulatory process depends not only on 
accountability and fairness, but whether agencies can efficiently 
carry out their statutory mandates—mandates that are the product 
of the democratic process.114 
The reliance on the rational-instrumental paradigm has had 
another pernicious effect.  Because civil servants are understood 
merely as agents, and unreliable agents at that, they are understood 
to lack any inherent legitimacy.  This opens the door for the 
demonization of the bureaucracy by our political leaders.  John 
Kennedy, with this declaration, “[a]sk not what your country can do 
for you—ask what you can do for your country,”115 is about the last 
political leader to consider government service as a noble calling.  
Bureaucracy bashing in turn has discouraged professionals from 
joining the government and has made it difficult to retain them once 
hired.116  Moreover, even though government cannot be effective 
without professionalized administration, the political system 
regards civic servants with disdain, preventing efforts to reform the 
 
 113. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Sidney A. 
Shapiro, University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest School of Law 
and Member Scholar and Vice President, Center for Progressive Reform), 
available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Shaprio_RAA_Tesimony 
_102511.pdf (demonstrating that, at a minimum, significant rules take 
approximately four to eight years to complete); CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., 
TECH., & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION 
MAKING 108 (1993) (reporting that the EPA said it takes about five years to 
complete an informal rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont 
Yankee III, IV, and V?  A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 902, 919 (2007) (“It is almost unheard of for a major rulemaking to be 
completed in the same presidential administration in which it began.  A major 
rulemaking typically is completed one, two, or even three administrations 
later.”). 
 114. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative 
Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978) (contending that administrative 
efficiency is of equal concern with accountability and fairness in the design of 
administrative procedure); Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of 
the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 855 (1975) (stating that 
efficiency, accountability, and fairness are of equal concern). 
 115. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1, 3 (1962). 
 116. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 108, at 129 (discussing studies 
showing the demoralization of the bureaucracy and the negative impact on 
hiring and retention). 
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civic service system, to ensure adequate funding of agencies, and to 
take the other steps necessary to guarantee effective and efficient 
public administration.117 
C. The False Dichotomy 
A further problem with the current state of affairs is that it 
leads to a false dichotomy.  Science and participation are understood 
to operate in separate institutional spheres rather than as closely 
interrelated constituent parts of public administration.  This is best 
seen in the context of risk regulation. 
A common feature of health and safety legislation is a 
legislative authorization to act on the basis of anticipated harm, 
which makes scientific uncertainty an unavoidable aspect of 
regulatory science.118  In order for agencies to act in the face of 
uncertainty, agencies have come to evaluate the scientific evidence 
using certain overly formalized frameworks such as risk assessment, 
which are often portrayed as the result of expert judgment.119  This 
rational-instrumental paradigm approach to regulatory science is 
problematic in three ways. 
First, particularly after the counterreformation, it encourages 
agencies to exaggerate the contributions made by science in 
resolving regulatory issues, a strategy that Wagner has 
characterized as a “science charade.”120  Because the goal of the 
rational-instrumental paradigm is to make agencies a transmission 
belt, it is in an administrator’s self-interest to claim that “science 
made me do it” as legal and political cover for a set of professional 
judgments.  This distorts an agency’s standard-setting mission and 
undermines transparency, driving up the costs of participation so 
that pluralism becomes even further beyond reach.  As Wagner 
notes, the “consequences range from administrative delays 
bordering on paralysis as experts debate incomplete science, to 
significant limitations on the ability of the public, the courts, and 
even public officials to participate in the policy choices embedded in 
scientific-sounding standards.”121 
The failure to admit regulatory decisions are the product of 
professional judgment also opens the door for the “sound science” 
campaign of regulatory opponents.122  This campaign points to 
scientific uncertainty to contend that regulatory action is not based 
 
 117. Id. at 194 (noting the adverse effects on bureaucracy of 
delegitimization). 
 118. See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 
37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 1089 (2007) [hereinafter Shapiro, Risk Assessment]. 
 119. Id. at 1087–90 (describing the interaction of law, science, and policy). 
 120. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Shapiro, Risk Assessment, supra note 118, at 1091. 
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on “sound science,” but the real objection is with Congress’s decision 
not to wait for more definitive information about the extent of a risk 
before a regulatory agency can act to reduce that risk.123  
Nevertheless, this argument persuades many due to the fact that 
public administration is not supposed to exercise the type of 
discretion that lies behind the use of regulatory science under the 
rational-instrumental paradigm. 
The rational-instrumental paradigm also hides the efforts of 
regulatory opponents to bend science to their interests, particularly 
by manufacturing uncertainty.124  Regulated entities often point to 
scientific evidence they claim demonstrates that risks to people and 
the environment are significantly lower than agencies claim, and on 
several occasions have even commissioned research to raise doubts 
about the building scientific consensus.125  Regulated parties have 
also attacked research and researchers to undermine their 
credibility, sometimes in ways that are not scientifically credible but 
nevertheless prove effective in the political sphere.126  Indeed, 
manufacturing uncertainty has been such a successful approach to 
the obstruction of protective regulations that the tobacco industry 
spearheaded an appropriations rider, the Data Quality Act, to 
provide a formal vehicle for stakeholders to challenge the reliability 
of research used by agencies at any point in the regulatory 
process.127 
D. Stunted Growth 
Our last objection to the dominance of the rational-instrumental 
paradigm is that it has discouraged legal scholars from considering 
the potential of inside-out accountability to offset some of the 
weaknesses of outside-in accountability.  In 1903, Bruce Wyman 
made a distinction between external and internal administrative 
practice,128 and, with some exceptions,129 the “possibility that 
 
 123. See generally Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics 
and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 612–13 (1996) (explaining 
that the “sound science” campaign objects not to the quality of data collected 
but to regulations based on incomplete scientific information and conservative 
default rules). 
 124. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW 
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 157–161 (2008); DAVID 
MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE 
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 198 (2008). 
 125. MICHAELS, supra note 124, at 137–38. 
 126. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 124, at 165–168. 
 127. Id. at 151. 
 128. BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING 
THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4–23 (1903). 
 129. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 15 (1983). 
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something is going on inside the agency that contributes to 
democratic accountability is never seriously considered.”130 
The preoccupation with outside-in accountability has infected 
even the newest efforts to reform public administration.  Both civic 
republican and new governance reforms operate within the outside-
in paradigm.131 
1. Civic Republican Reform 
Legal scholars seeking to revive civic republicanism have 
recognized the significance of deliberation and reason giving for 
legitimating public administration, but they place civic 
republicanism in the context of outside-in accountability.  By 
portraying civic republicanism as a process that primarily engages 
those citizens who are not already engaged in civil service, legal 
scholars understand civic republicanism as a theory of democracy 
writ large rather than a theory of administrative constitutionalism. 
Taking classic republicanism as their inspiration, these scholars 
look to make the administrative process more deliberative and less 
subject to pluralistic politics, looking to the courts to effectuate these 
changes.132  Even the most nuanced scholar advocating civic 
republicanism, Mark Seidenfeld, understands civic republicanism in 
this manner.  While he discusses the role of professionalism in 
public administration, he ultimately calls for heightened judicial 
review to turn rulemaking into a more civic republican process.133  
Although Seidenfeld treats the transmission belt thesis as a myth, 
he does not trust professionalism to produce the civic republican 
dialogue that he seeks.  This places his efforts squarely within an 
outside-in approach. 
No one argues that we can dispense with judicial review, but we 
need to consider that inside-out accountability can reduce the need 
for the type of outside-in judicial review that currently operates.  
With this recognition, we can avoid the rulemaking ossification that 
 
 130.  Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 580. 
 131. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 356 (2004); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992). 
 132. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66–73 (1986) (calling on the courts to define the values 
which underlie governmental policy and which are embodied in law); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.  REV. 29, 72 
(1985) (seeking to revitalize Congress’s deliberative processes through more 
active judicial review). 
 133. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547, 1556–57 (1992). 
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comes with the aggressive judicial review of the type Seidenfeld 
supports.134 
2. New Governance Reform 
This same complaint applies to the new governance scholars.135  
In their search for alternatives to traditional standard setting, new 
governance scholars advocate other institutions that can create 
regulatory structures and foster a dialogue between stakeholders.  
Stakeholder involvement is seen as crucial.  Orly Lobel, for example, 
notes new governance reforms are “based on engaging multiple 
actors and shifting citizens from passive to active roles,” thereby 
pluralizing the “exercise of normative authority.”136  It may be that 
new governance reformers can find policy networks in which all 
stakeholders are represented; the empirical evidence we reviewed 
earlier, however, suggests that the lack of pluralism may be a 
significant constraint on legitimizing alternative decision-making 
arrangements.137 
Beyond this challenge, we see some new governance scholars as 
rejecting the deliberative-constitutive paradigm that we seek to 
promote alongside the rational-instrumental paradigm.  For them, 
the job of the bureaucracy is to steer policy networks towards 
solutions to regulatory problems,138 making it an alternative version 
of the outside-in administrative pluralism endorsed by the 
reformation. 
The new governance project has much to recommend it.  As 
compared to the reforms adopted in the counter-reformation, it 
recognizes and seeks to address the discretionary nature of public 
administration.  But, like the civic republican efforts, it cannot 
legitimize public administration because it distrusts, or at least fails 
to recognize, how the deliberative-constitutive paradigm contributes 
to administrative constitutionalism.139 
 
 134. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 529–30 
(1997) (explaining why Seidenfeld’s approach to judicial review will increase 
ossification). 
 135. See Lobel, supra note 131, at 344 (describing the program of new 
governance scholars). 
 136. Id. at 373. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 359. 
 139. Elizabeth Fisher, Unpacking the Toolbox: Or Why the Public/Private 
Divide Is Important in EC Environmental Law, in THE PUBLIC LAW/PRIVATE 
LAW DIVIDE: UNE ENTENTE ASSEZ CORDIALE? 236, 238–40 (Mark Freedland & 
Jean-Bernard Auby eds., 2006). 
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IV.  TOWARD ENLIGHTENMENT 
We find ourselves stuck with an unsustainable understanding 
of administrative constitutionalism.  We therefore turn to a 
consideration of the potential of the deliberative-constitutive 
paradigm and inside-out accountability to foster administrative 
constitutionalism.  We begin by arguing that the Progressives were 
mostly correct about the potential for professionalism to contribute 
to the legitimacy of public administration.  We then consider how 
inside-out accountability contributes to legitimizing public 
administration. 
We are not arguing that the deliberative-constitutive paradigm 
should replace the rational-instrumental paradigm.  Rather, our 
argument is that the enlightenment of American administrative law 
will only occur with the recognition of both paradigms and with a 
more wide-ranging understanding of public administration and 
administrative constitutionalism.  Indeed, the notion of “redundancy 
checks” is well known in engineering, particularly for potentially 
catastrophic technologies such as nuclear power plant safety.  We 
call for similar types of redundancy checks in administrative 
practice that utilize both outside-in and inside-out processes to 
enhance legitimacy and accountability.  Administrative law scholars 
and lawyers need to broaden their worldview. 
A. The Real Progressive Legacy 
Doubts about Progressive claims for the legitimacy of public 
administration reflect two influences.  First, the Progressives were 
obviously mistaken that there could be a science of administration 
that operates outside the sphere of policy making.  Second, in light 
of public choice explanations of bureaucratic behavior, this failure 
makes it impossible to legitimize public administration from the 
outside-in.  These objections overlook a more complex argument 
made by Progressives on behalf of professionalism and 
accountability, one for which there is considerable evidence. 
1. Professionalism, Not Objectivity 
The belief of the original Progressives that public 
administration would be democratic was based on three premises.140  
Government employees would be hired on the basis of their 
technical skills and professional training.  Further, the political 
system would make the necessary policy choices when a law was 
passed, leaving it to the employees to use their training and 
expertise to find the best way to implement it.  Lastly, employees 
 
 140. GERALD GARVEY, FACING THE BUREAUCRACY: LIVING AND DYING IN A 
PUBLIC AGENCY 20–25 (1993). 
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would refrain from making political decisions because of their 
training, personal preferences, and professional ethics. 
The Progressives soon recognized, however, the difficulty with 
the second premise that there could be an objective science of 
administration.  Herbert Croly, for example, maintained that while 
an expert administrator must be a “social expert,”141 expertise 
needed to “be kept articulate with the democracy.”142  He and other 
Progressives believed that this could be done when civic servants 
operated within the bounds of professionalism, the third assumption 
of the Progressive legacy. 
The public choice challenge to inside-out accountability ignores 
the potential of professionalization and organizational culture to 
promote other-regarding behavior.  Professionals are trained to 
evaluate information on the basis of standards of evaluation 
external to the agency.  In doing so, they utilize the methodology 
that they have been trained and socialized to employ.  Peers 
reinforce this behavior by approving of those who follow it and 
distancing themselves from those who do not.143 
When professionals act in this manner, they provide a balanced 
picture of information as part of professional behavior.144  This 
means, for example, that lawyers present to agency administrators 
the information necessary to decide on a course of action.  Likewise, 
scientists present an impartial reading of the evidence available to 
them because their professional training and self-identity dictate 
this behavior.  
As noted earlier, the deliberative-constitutive paradigm took a 
beating in the 1970s from both the political left and right,145 but 
contemporary understandings of professionalism indicate that this 
complete distrust was misplaced.  Lamont’s powerful study of 
interdisciplinary academic funding panels in the United States is a 
case in point.146  Lamont highlights the roles of expertise, 
preparation, discourse, socialization, and pragmatism in this 
context.  Her ethnography is not to romanticize the role of 
professionalism in academia but to show how it produces workable 
results.147  Sennett’s recent works on socialized expertise148 and 
dialogic cooperation149 furnish additional examples of the 
significance and reliability of professionalism.  In the more specific 
 
 141. CROLY, supra note 53, at 361. 
 142. Id. at 373. 
 143. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 592–93. 
 144. Id. at 588. 
 145. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 146. See generally MICHÈLE LAMONT, HOW PROFESSORS THINK: INSIDE THE 
WORLD OF ACADEMIC JUDGMENT ch. 5 (2009). 
 147. See generally id. 
 148. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CRAFTSMAN 246–49 (2008). 
 149. See generally RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE RITUALS, PLEASURES 
AND POLITICS OF COOPERATION (2012). 
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area of risk regulation, the National Research Council’s discussion 
of “analytical-deliberative” approaches to decision making also 
provides an important blueprint.150 
Much of the academic work on professionalism can be found in 
the public administration literature, which puts professionalism at 
the center of its traditional concept of the civil service.151  We now 
turn to the evidence about professionalism in that literature, which 
indicates the potential of professionalism in agencies that are 
properly managed and have a culture of professionalism. 
2. The Evidence 
Herbert Kaufman’s study of the United States Forest Service 
remains the classic study of how professionalism defeats self-
interest.152  At the time of Kaufman’s study, which was before 
modern advances in communication, the far-flung physical locations 
of Forest Service officers made it difficult to monitor and direct 
them.  Concerned that this would result in inconsistent policies and 
possible corruption, Gifford Pinchot, the first director of the Forest 
Service, set out to build an organization composed of professional 
foresters, using various methodologies.153  These efforts produced 
what Kaufman characterized as “voluntary conformity” to the goals 
and public purposes of the Forest Service.154  Kaufman found 
“almost no charges of administrative sabotage by frustrated leaders, 
for example; comparatively few accusations of local favoritism and 
discrimination by the clientele of the national forests; [and] no 
discoveries by Congressional investigators of scandalous field 
collusion with special interests.”155 
More recent work corroborates Kaufman’s findings.  John 
Brehm and Scott Gates, for example, compared surveys of 
government and local employees that indicate how the employees 
view their own behavior and how it is viewed by their fellow 
workers, supervisors, and outside persons.156  The data consistently 
indicated “bureaucrats devote the majority of their time to working, 
rather than to shirking or to sabotage . . . .”157  In other words, 
Brehm and Gates found no evidence that bureaucrats exercised 
 
 150. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING 
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 75–76 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg 
eds., 1996). 
 151. See, e.g., DIANA WOODHOUSE, IN PURSUIT OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION: 
MINISTERS, CIVIL SERVANTS, AND JUDGES 28 (1997). 
 152. See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960). 
 153. Id. at 85–86. 
 154. Id. at 198. 
 155. Id. at 204. 
 156. JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE IN A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 198 (1999). 
 157. Id. at 98. 
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their self-interest by failing to work (shirking) or by working to 
defeat the policies of their political bosses (sabotage).  Brehm and 
Gates attributed this behavior to professional influences because 
they found that supervisors had little ability to influence behavior 
by financial rewards or the threat to fire employees.158  In light of 
these constraints, they believed the results were attributable to 
rewards such as “recognition from others, accomplishing worthwhile 
things, [and] serving the public interest . . . .”159 
A similar result is found in Marissa Golden’s study of how 
upper-level civil servants in four agencies responded to the election 
of Ronald Reagan.160  The situation provided a good test of the 
reliability of government employees because, in each of the agencies 
Golden studied, the Reagan administration attempted to “turn 
agency policy 180 degrees from its past.”161  Nevertheless, Golden 
found that “career civil servants were, for the most part, responsive 
to this change in elected leadership.”162  Golden attributes this 
loyalty in part to internal hierarchical controls, noting that civic 
servants “did not want to be demoted or banished, and sought to 
advance their careers.”163  She also found, however, that civic 
servants understood that their role was to present information to 
political appointees and help them decide how best to carry out the 
President’s policy preferences.164 
B. Democratic Legitimacy 
Various arguments have been made for how the deliberative-
constitutive paradigm burnishes the democratic legitimacy of the 
bureaucracy.  The boldest claim is that historical documents relating 
to the framing of the Constitution indicate that the framers 
anticipated that administrators would implement government, 
giving administration a constitutional legitimacy.165  More modest 
claims start with the progressive formulation that 
professionalization makes the bureaucracy a reliable servant of 
political administrators for the reasons expressed in the last section.  
Public administration, however, is also understood to add positive 
democratic value. 
There are different perspectives concerning how bureaucracy 
adds to democratic legitimacy.  Some public administration scholars 
see this effort as communitarian, in which administrators facilitate 
 
 158. Id. at 82–83. 
 159. Id. at 80–83, 195. 
 160. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS 
AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 151–54 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 151–52. 
 162. Id. at 152. 
 163. Id. at 158–59. 
 164. Id. at 155. 
 165. See generally ROHR, supra note 2. 
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purposive action among their fellow citizens.166  Other scholars 
advocate that the bureaucracy can represent their fellow citizens if 
the public service reflects different populations in the community 
and presents their point of view.167  Still others believe that the 
bureaucracy serves democracy when it speaks truth to power.  This 
occurs when professionals challenge political appointees by pointing 
out how policies that they favor are inconsistent with scientific and 
policy evidence.168  While ultimately civic servants will defer to 
political appointees, this role supports democratic legitimacy by 
warning administrators that they may not be faithfully executing 
the statutes they administer.  Finally, another group of scholars 
sees the role of bureaucracy as discursive, with administrators 
reaching out to individuals and organizations to dialogue about 
solutions for public problems.169 
Whatever the merits of the other approaches in other contexts, 
we see the last two ideas as being best suited for rulemaking.  The 
role of speaking truth to power takes advantage of having a 
professionalized staff.170  Rulemaking, especially for health, safety, 
and environmental issues, relies on scientific, economic, and 
engineering data.  This means civic servants are in a position to be 
honest brokers concerning the implications of this evidence.  
Moreover, even as to nontechnical issues, civic servants are in a 
position to speak truth to power.  As long-time employees, they 
constitute the institutional memory of the agency, particularly in a 
world in which political administrators come and go, sometimes as 
often as every few months.  As the repository of the institutional 
memory, civic servants can bring that wisdom into the rulemaking 
process, for example, pointing out approaches than have or have not 
worked in the past. 
Proponents of a discursive role for civil servants contend that 
the discursive process itself legitimizes the outcome of the process 
through debate and deliberation.  For postmodernists, it is only 
possible to construct a legitimate policy through such vetting.171  
But it is not necessary to endorse this viewpoint to understand the 
 
 166. See, e.g., TERRY L. COOPER, AN ETHIC OF CITIZENSHIP FOR PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 139–42, 160–69  (1991). 
 167. See, e.g., Robert B. Denhardt & Linda deLeon, Great Thinkers in 
Personnel Management, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 21, 
32–34 (Jack Rabin et. al. eds., 1993); Grace Hall Saltzstein, Representative 
Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Responsibility: Problems and Prospects, 10 
ADMIN. & SOC’Y. 465, 466–69 (1979). 
 168. See, e.g., Michael W. Spicer & Larry D. Terry, Legitimacy, History, and 
Logic: Public Administration and the Constitution, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 239, 
245 (1993). 
 169. See generally CHARLES JOHNSON FOX & HUGH T. MILLER, POSTMODERN 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: TOWARD DISCOURSE (1991). 
 170. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 616. 
 171. FOX & MILLER, supra note 169, at 11, 13. 
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value of a discursive approach.  With the demise of pluralism in 
rulemaking, the bureaucracy can offset or mitigate industry 
dominance by reaching out to individuals and organizations in 
policy networks with differing points of view, rather than relying 
passively on whatever information comes in through the rulemaking 
process.  Professional values serve to further enhance the 
assimilation and processing of this evidence into regulatory 
products. 
The type of dialogue that this process creates addresses the 
limitations of interest-group pluralism discussed earlier.  An agency 
would have the advice and insight of multiple perspectives rather 
than having input only from business interests.  If a proposed rule 
results from a thorough discursive process, the agency is also less 
likely to fall prey to filter failure, in which it is so busy responding to 
comments filed by business interests that it loses sight of the bigger 
picture. 
V.  AN EXAMPLE FROM U.S. PRACTICE 
An example of a regulatory approach that epitomizes these 
deliberative, inside-out characteristics helps crystallize this more 
abstract discussion.  In this Part, we turn to a high profile 
rulemaking process used in the United States to set national 
ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”).  This standard-setting is 
highly science intensive, but it also has extraordinary policy costs 
and consequences.172  Because of its social significance, the EPA, 
which sets these standards, has been under intense public, political, 
congressional, and judicial pressure over the last four decades 
concerning each of its proposed revisions.173  The standard-setting 
process emerging from these heated battles, in our view, exemplifies 
what the deliberative-constitutive paradigm can contribute to 
administrative constitutionalism. 
A. The NAAQS Process 
Section 109 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to review, at 
five-year intervals, the standards for six criteria or general 
pollutants that the EPA identifies under Section 108 of the Act.174  
These NAAQS must be set at a level “requisite to protect the public 
health” with “an adequate margin of safety.”175  While the Supreme 
 
 172. Zeke Miller, President Obama’s $90 BILLION Clean Air Regulation, 
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-09-01 
/politics/30027580_1_clean-air-rule-obama-administration-new-rules. 
 173. See, e.g., Scott Learn, Environmental News: Pressure’s on EPA to back 
off New Smog Regulation, OREGONLIVE (July 18, 2011, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/07/environmental_news
_pressures_o.html. 
 174. Clean Air Act §109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (2006). 
 175. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
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Court interprets the statute as allowing the EPA to consider only 
scientific, not economic, factors in setting the primary health 
standards for these criteria pollutants,176 there is still a great deal of 
room for technical maneuvering within scientifically plausible 
options.  Indeed, the remaining agency discretion is so great that a 
majority in one D.C. Circuit judgment concluded that this section of 
the Act violated the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution.177 
Given their national role in specifying the lowest acceptable air 
quality for any region in the United States, the selection of the 
NAAQS has significant regulatory consequences.  Elaborate 
regulatory permits and state implementation plans ensure that 
these specific NAAQS are met.178  Billions of dollars, both in health 
protection and compliance costs, hinge on adjustments as small as 
even one-thousandth of a part per million for the standard for any 
given criteria pollutant.179  Presidential elections also can turn on, 
or at least be affected by, an administration’s decision to make 
NAAQS more stringent or not.180 
1. The Old Way 
Until a recent change of direction, the EPA’s approach to setting 
the NAAQS largely followed the rational-instrumental paradigm.  
From the 1980s to mid-2005, the EPA produced assessments that 
grew increasingly voluminous and were considered relatively 
impenetrable to anyone other than air quality experts, and even 
these experts were challenged by the document.181  Producing these 
 
 176. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464–65 (2001). 
 177. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034–40 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 178. See Laws and Regulations, EPA (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.epa.gov 
/oaqps001/permits/requirem.html; State Implementation Plan Overview, EPA 
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/sipstatus/overview.html. 
 179. See, e.g., Summary of the Updated Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for 
the Reconsideration of the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS) at S1–4, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/s1 
-supplemental_analysis_summary11-5-09.pdf (indicating a range of between 
about $12 billion and more than $20 billion in costs annually between an ozone 
standard of 0.070 ppm versus 0.075 ppm). 
 180. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Obama Abandons a Stricter Limit on Air 
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at A1 (describing President Obama’s 
decision to reject a more stringent ozone standard despite strong scientific 
evidence, including CASAC endorsement in its favor); Clinton Oks Tough Clean 
Air Standards: Congress has Power to Overturn New Rules, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, June 26, 1997, at A1 (describing President Clinton’s controversial 
decision to back the EPA’s more stringent ozone standard).  Vice President Gore 
was even dubbed the “Ozone Man” by President George H. W. Bush during 
campaign season due to Gore’s advocacy of strong air quality rules.  ‘Ozone 
Man’, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 14, 2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-10 
-14/news/0710140148_1_warming-gore-climate-change. 
 181. EPA, REVIEW OF THE PROCESS FOR SETTING NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARDS 3–5 (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/pdfs 
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reports was so unwieldy that the EPA itself could not complete them 
in a five-year time frame as required by statute and was perpetually 
at risk of being in contempt of court.182  The agency also found itself 
under constant attack for the judgments reached in its decisions.183 
2. The New Way 
This all changed in 2006 when the EPA redesigned the NAAQS 
process.  The current approach involves five separate analytical 
steps and products. 
a.  The Planning Report 
The first step sets the stage for the integration of scientists, 
stakeholders, public health advocates, and professional agency staff 
by convening a “kick-off” workshop184 that is followed by a staff-
authored report that articulates the overarching policy questions 
that will guide the process.185  The report is reviewed by the “Clean 
Air Science Advisory Committee” (“CASAC”), a statutorily required 
standing committee of top scientists chartered under the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), and by the public before it is 
final.186   
 The resulting final planning report is thus a professional, 
staff-authored document that has been reviewed iteratively by the 
public and external scientists.187  This planning report, moreover, is 
 
/naaqs_process_report_march2006.pdf (describing the process prior to 2006).  
The summaries of the assessments found in the agency’s proposed rulemaking 
preamble were somewhat more accessible, but they were litigation oriented 
rather than presenting a dispassionate and frank discussion about limits in the 
evidence.  See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 120, at 1629–31 (providing several 
examples of this). 
 182. See, e.g., Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. EPA, No. C 07–03678 JSW, 2008 
WL 1994898, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (bringing suit to compel the EPA to 
perform its past due, mandatory review duties). 
 183. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1055–56 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 184. The “kick-off” workshop is a major event during which the agency’s 
staff solicits comments from the public and scientific community (including 
invited scientists) about developments in the science and policy that should 
frame the EPA’s review.  The workshop focuses specifically on scientific 
discoveries and related developments occurring over the past five years that 
might suggest the need for a revised standard and hence deserve careful 
scientific review.  See, e.g., EPA, supra note 181, at 9–10. 
 185. The primary purpose of this planning document is to frame “key policy-
relevant issues that would generally be used to frame the science assessment, 
risk/exposure assessment, and policy assessment . . . .”  Id.  The report also sets 
a timetable for subsequent stages of the process.  Id. 
 186. Id. at 14. 
 187. For a sample planning document, see generally EPA, INTEGRATED 
REVIEW PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
PARTICULATE MATTER (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs 
/standards/pm/data/2008_03_final_integrated_review_plan.pdf.  In particular, 
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integral to enhancing transparency of the NAAQS review process.188  
By framing the relevant science-policy questions, the planning 
report focuses the EPA’s subsequent NAAQS review, which 
stretches over a four-year process.189 
b.  Integrated Scientific Assessment Report   
At the next step of the NAAQS review process, the EPA 
compiles an integrated scientific assessment (“ISA”) that reviews all 
of the scientific evidence.190  In stark contrast to the EPA’s earlier 
version of this assessment in previous NAAQS processes, the new 
and improved ISA is more concise and focuses the assessment on the 
specific questions framed in the planning report.  More detailed 
information is reserved for annexes, which can sometimes be longer 
than the body of the report itself. 
The document is prepared in a way that is roughly equivalent to 
a large team-authored scientific review paper.  Academics generally 
are contracted to draft the individual chapters of the ISA, with 
multiple points of review (at least three) from intra-agency 
reviewers, CASAC, and the public before the ISA is considered 
final.191  Like other NAAQS documents, the ISA includes a detailed 
list of the EPA executive staff, authors, contributors, and peer 
reviewers.192  Authors and peer reviewers outside the agency are 
also listed by name and affiliation in the front matter.193  Staff 
members who disagree with the scientific analysis may remove their 
names.  At the same time, those who agree are held accountable for 
the contents.194 
 
 
 
see id. at 18–21 (listing policy-relevant questions for primary PM NAAQS that 
expand on the excerpts provided above in the text). 
 188. See generally id. 
 189. Id. at 18. (“The first step . . . is to consider whether the available body 
of scientific evidence . . . supports or calls into question the scientific conclusions 
reached in the last review regarding health effects related to exposure to fine 
and thoracic coarse particles in the ambient air.  This evaluation of the 
available scientific evidence will focus on key policy-relevant issues by 
addressing a series of questions . . . .”). 
 190. Air Quality: EPA’s Integrated Science Assessments (ISAs), EPA (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/ncea/isa/basicinfo.htm. 
 191. See EPA, supra note 187, at fig. 4.1 (creating a descriptive flowchart for 
production of the scientific assessment). 
 192. For an example, see NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, INTEGRATED 
SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR LEAD, at xxii–xxx (2011), available at 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=505106. 
 193. Id. at xxii–xxviii. 
 194. Id. at xxii–xxx. 
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c.  Risk/Exposure Assessment Report 
Based on the analysis of the scientific evidence in the ISA, the 
EPA staff then prepares a separate risk assessment report that 
applies this evidence to predict the effects of alternate standards on 
public health.  The goal at this stage is to employ multiple models to 
produce quantitative risk estimates, accompanied by expressions of 
the underlying uncertainties and variability for various endpoints, 
such as the impacts of a pollutant on susceptible populations and 
ecosystems.195  The risk assessment process itself begins with a 
planning/scoping stage, which again involves CASAC review and 
public comment, followed by two more periods of intra-agency, 
CASAC, and public comment on the draft risk assessment reports.196 
d.  Policy Assessment Report 
The last document in the process is a policy assessment that 
“bridges” these more science-intensive (ISA and risk assessment) 
reports with the policy questions at hand.  In summarizing the 
evidence in a way that relates to the overarching policy question, the 
report offers alternative health protection scenarios and standards, 
accompanied by discussions of unknowns and uncertainties.  The 
policy analysis also identifies questions for further research.  The 
policy assessment is, in and of itself, an extensive document (in the 
EPA’s review of the particulate matter standard, the policy 
assessment was over 450 pages in length, including appendices),197 
but the discussion is written for laypersons who do not have an 
extensive background in the relevant science.   
The policy assessment is reviewed by internal EPA staff and by 
CASAC, sometimes several times, to ensure that important 
scientific information is not lost in translation.198  It is worth noting 
that even at this late stage, CASAC review and comment is rigorous 
and extensive.  For example, the second CASAC review of the EPA’s 
Policy Assessment for the Review of the Particulate Matter (“PM”) 
NAAQS consisted of over seventy pages of single-spaced 
comments.199 
 
 195. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 187, at 41 (describing this goal of the risk 
assessment). 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 54. 
 197. For a sample of a policy assessment, see generally EPA, POLICY 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE PARTICULATE MATTER NATIONAL AMBIENT 
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs 
/standards/pm/data/20110419pmpafinal.pdf. 
 198. For a very brief summary of CASAC input, see id. at 2–100 to 2–101 
(summarizing CASAC advice). 
 199. For the second CASAC review of the EPA’s policy assessment for 
particulates, see Letter from Dr. Jonathan M. Samet, Chair, CASAC, to Lisa P. 
Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab 
/sabproduct.nsf/CCF9F4C0500C500F8525779D0073C593/$File/EPA-CASAC-
10-015-unsigned.pdf. 
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e.  The Proposed and Final Rulemaking Process 
Based on this wealth of deliberative science-policy work, the 
EPA management identifies a standard and prepares a proposed 
rule that is cleared through the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) and then published in the Federal Register.  At this point, 
the outside-in model kicks in.  Stakeholders appreciate that if they 
wish to preserve their challenges for judicial review, they must 
submit comments that raise every issue of concern.200  After notice 
and comment and further inter-governmental deliberations, the 
EPA promulgates a final rule. 
B. The Deliberative-Constitutive Elements 
The NAAQS review process exemplifies how the deliberative-
constitutive process can work to employ professionalism in the 
pursuit of democratic accountability from the inside-out.  We see five 
aspects of the NAAQS process that not only illustrate this potential 
but suggest a pathway for bolstering the deliberative-constitutive 
approach in other regulatory contexts. 
1. The Process is Professional 
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the EPA’s process is the role 
that the agency’s professional staff plays in this deliberative 
exercise.  Professional EPA experts and academics, not agency 
managers, author the reports.  While EPA management is briefed 
through information sessions on the contents of these reports, there 
is no editing of the report by management.201  Indeed, at least some 
of the draft NAAQS reports contain the disclaimer that the 
“opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations” reflect those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
EPA.202  The team of staff authors is also generally listed by name in 
the acknowledgments section of the final report, and their names 
are linked to specific contributions in individual chapters.203 
 
 200. See, e.g., Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: 
Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10–25 (1985) 
(outlining the rationale behind the exhaustion requirement). 
 201. Interview by Wendy Wagner with EPA Staff, Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. 
Assessment, Office of Research & Dev. (Jan. 18, 2012). 
 202. See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DRAFT POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW 
OF THE PARTICULATE MATTER NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (2009), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data 
/PreliminaryDraftPA091609.pdf.  Note in this document that the names of 
individual staff are not listed, however.  This is different from the final report, 
which includes a detailed acknowledgement section that lists staff and 
reviewers by name and identifies their specific contributions to the report. 
 203. It is not clear whether an agency staff member has the right to remove 
his or her name from this acknowledgement section if he or she disagrees with 
the final version of the chapter (presumably the issue has not yet arisen), but if 
this is the case, then these acknowledgements provide an indicia of authorship. 
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The use of staff scientists to prepare all the foundational 
assessments underlying the NAAQS review is a deliberate feature in 
the design of the process.  For a short time, responsibility for 
authorship of the policy assessment was shifted from EPA staff to 
management and published as an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“ANPR”).204  The management-drafted policy 
assessment was harshly criticized by both the EPA’s Office of 
Research Development and by CASAC.205  CASAC, in particular, 
noted that the management-drafted policy assessment departed 
from the scientific recommendations of agency scientists, did not 
connect the policy options suggested to the scientific evidence, and 
presented options as equally plausible, despite their very different 
scientific underpinnings.206  In response to this controversy, 
Administrator Lisa Jackson ultimately returned responsibility of the 
policy assessment to the EPA professional staff.207  Employees and 
CASAC report a high level of satisfaction with this change.208 
Agency staff authorship is valuable for several reasons.  Not 
only does authorship provide agency staff with well-deserved credit 
for their work, but it creates accountability for the quality of the 
final technical product.  Those who are part of a consensus report 
take responsibility for the contents.  Respected scientists within and 
outside the agency also scrutinize the staff’s work.  This scientific 
oversight further enhances the staff’s commitment to 
professionalism and rewards quality.  Authorship also sharpens 
internal discussions, ensures that revisions are generally on the 
merits rather than politically convenient, and even provides signals 
to the outside world of the backgrounds of the individuals doing 
these important analyses.  Finally, authorship helps separate the 
 
 204. Because the assessment was published as an ANPR, it required OMB-
clearance. 
 205. Interview by Wendy Wagner with EPA Staff, Office of Air Quality 
Planning & Standards (Jan. 17, 2012). 
 206. See Letter from Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair, CASAC et al. to Stephen 
L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab 
/sabproduct.nsf/B7E63138A2041A22852573DB005D4E98/$File/EPA-CASAC-
08-008-unsigned.pdf (condemning the ANPR for lead prepared by EPA 
management as “unsuitable and inadequate” because it does not provide “the 
underlying scientific justification” for the “range of options for standard setting” 
that the agency is currently considering, and providing substantial details in 
the remainder of the letter regarding these concerns). 
 207. See Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, to Elizabeth 
Craig, Acting Assistant Amd’r for Air & Radiation, EPA, & Lek Kadeli, Acting 
Assistant Adm’r for Research & Dev., EPA (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/pdfs/NAAQSReviewProcessMemo52109.pdf 
(regarding the process for reviewing NAAQS). 
 208. Interview by Wendy Wagner with EPA Staff, Nat’l Ctr. for Envt’l 
Assessment, Office of Research and Dev. (Jan. 18, 2012); interview by Wendy 
Wagner with EPA Staff, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (Jan. 17, 
2012). 
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report—figuratively and literally—from management, an important 
attribute we consider again below. 
This staff authorship is easily adapted to other rulemakings, 
particularly those that are initiated with an initial staff scientific 
report.  Even the preamble of a proposed rule could provide 
attribution or acknowledgments, however.  Regardless of its form, 
by providing this attribution, the agency affords the staff not only 
well-deserved credit but provides the staff the opportunity to opt out 
or even dissent from an agency’s public scientific analysis. 
2. The Process is Iterative and Discursive 
The agency’s interactions with experts, the public, and other 
technical staff throughout the NAAQS process are iterative and 
discursive.  Four separate staff reports are reviewed multiple 
times—a total of at least seven back-and-forths with the public, 
agency staff, and CASAC.209  The comments are logged into the 
public record, as are the EPA’s responses to comments.  The staff 
also works closely with CASAC, which enhances the scientific rigor 
and credibility of the report.  The resulting interactions lead to a 
scientifically respected process for an otherwise very controversial 
and socially important standard.210 
Each of the reports in the NAAQS process is also prepared with 
the goal of communicating the findings in a way that is accessible 
and clear, which further advances the deliberative quality of the 
process.  Reports that are succinct and accessible invite a wide 
range of participants into the deliberative process, which, in turn, 
provides a powerful method of accountability.211  The success of the 
NAAQS process in producing reports that are in fact succinct and 
accessible was spotlighted in a National Academy of Sciences report 
that identified the NAAQS reviews as a model with respect to 
providing a sophisticated, yet cogent, review and interpretation of 
the available evidence and models.212 
 
 209. See Jackson Memo, supra note 207. 
 210. See, e.g., EPA, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE 
DECISIONS 38 (1992), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vem91d00 
/pdf;jsessionid=E038C35EEEF84C12537448A1DA3EC1ED.tobacco03 (noting 
the positive effect of CASAC on EPA’s decisions); MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT 
EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 43 (1999) (reporting on how 
persons interviewed for the study on science at the EPA “gave SAB and CASAC 
credit for improving EPA’s acquisition and use of science”). 
 211. See Memorandum from Roger O. McClellan, Advisor, Toxicology & 
Human Health Risk Analysis, EPA, to Dr. George Gray, Assistant Adm’r for the 
Office of Research & Dev., EPA (Mar. 18, 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov 
/ttnnaaqs/pdfs/naaqs_process_report_march2006_attachments.pdf. 
 212. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY’S DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT OF FORMALDEHYDE 120–21 
(2011). 
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While such an elaborate process is not possible in most 
rulemakings because of limited time and resources, many of the 
iterative features of the NAAQS review process can nevertheless be 
adapted to other rulemaking settings.  For example, a kick-off 
workshop that identifies the policy questions and surveys the 
available evidence is a relatively common feature of a number of 
rulemakings.213  Separating out these processes may add only a few 
weeks at most to a rulemaking exercise, but the value of doing so is 
considerable since it allows the agency to dedicate a separate, 
deliberative step to what is often the most important part of the 
rulemaking exercise—framing the assignment.  Subsequent, 
iterative stages of feedback in the NAAQS process could be collapsed 
by making initial reports publicly accessible, without a formal 
comment period, so that comments can be wrapped into the later 
public comment process.  A science advisory board might even be 
involved early and at multiple points in the evolution of a proposed 
rule to ensure that the end product is as technically accurate as 
possible. 
3. Inside-Out Accountability 
Beyond the professional and deliberative qualities of the 
NAAQS review process is its relative insulation from both the 
political process and aggressive interest representation driven 
judicial review, a feature that is consistent with inside-out 
accountability.  This insulation derives in part from the fact that the 
iterative reports precede the separate, proposed rule process and 
also by concerted efforts by agency staff to keep staff and 
management roles separate and distinct.  The goal in all four 
reports is to characterize the scientific record and policy options as 
clearly as possible. 
Political managers are involved in this scientific phase only via 
informational briefing sessions, and OMB is not involved at all in 
any of these four reports.214  Although this insulation, combined 
with the commitment to staff authorship and professional quality, 
cannot ensure “neutral” advice, the NAAQS review process 
simulates scientific review and thus comes about as close to 
neutrality as a regulatory process can.  Later on, at the proposed 
rule stage, management will struggle publicly with how to portray 
this information to justify its decision. 
4. Support of Outside-In Accountability 
The final policy assessment, which bridges the scientific 
findings with the policy questions, begins a shift to outside-in 
 
 213. See Jackson Memo, supra note 207. 
 214. See id. (indicating that there is no OMB involvement in the NAAQS 
review process). 
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accountability.  With the basic research and assumptions laid bare, 
stakeholders and others can then engage in the process in a more 
meaningful way.  Indeed, one can view the NAAQS review process 
as essentially beginning with an inside-out process, embodied in the 
four reports, that then switches over to the outside-in process at the 
time the agency begins drafting its proposed rule.  At this point, 
familiar pluralistic oversight takes over.  OMB will engage with the 
EPA in identifying and supporting a preferred standard.  Interest 
groups will fill the record with comments that serve as placeholders 
for possible litigation.  And ultimately, the courts may review the 
agency’s work based on the record the EPA has created. 
This outside-in phase is constrained, potentially significantly, 
by the rigorous deliberative record prepared by staff, however.  
Stakeholders may find that the kinds of criticisms and alternatives 
they can offer are much more limited because of the extensive 
analysis that forms the basis for the NAAQS proposal. 
The credible threat of judicial review is also disciplined by the 
types of professional discussions documented in the record.  
Specifically, courts may be inclined to defer to the careful analysis 
embodied in the four reports.  Thus, a rule that goes through an 
inside-out process before it is subjected to stakeholder comments 
and judicial review may be at serious risk of reversal only when the 
agency’s final rule deviates in material ways from the building 
scientific consensus captured in its administrative record.215 
5. Speaking Truth to Power 
In recent years, two Presidents have actually set aside the 
agency’s robustly recommended NAAQS standards.  Presidents 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama both decided to effectively set 
aside the recommendations of CASAC and the EPA’s scientific staff 
with regard to setting revised standards for the NAAQS.216  It 
should be further noted that both of these presidential overrides 
were conducted on scientific recommendations that resulted from 
the EPA’s deployment of the new and improved NAAQS process.217 
 
 215. See, e.g., Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 676 F.3d 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (holding that FERC’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because 
“FERC’s expert staff,” which had found the petition to be a “slam dunk,” 
demonstrated that the Commission’s decision “was unreasonable in light of the 
record evidence”). 
 216. See Arnold W. Reitz, Jr., The Intersection of Climate Change and Clean 
Air Act Stationary Source Programs, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 930 (2011) (“[O]n 
September 11, 2011, President Obama rejected EPA’s proposed changes to the 
ozone standard.”); Juliet Eilperin, Proposed Standards for Air Quality 
Criticized, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn 
/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001412.html. 
 217. Obama Blocks Stricter Ozone Standards, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP: 
WASH. ENERGY REP., http://www.troutmansandersenergyreport.com/2011/09 
/obama-blocks-stricter-ozone-standards/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
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Ironically, however, this trumping of the work of agency 
professionals may be evidence of the great success of the inside-out 
approach.  Because the agency’s analyses were effectively ironclad, 
the dissenting Presidents could not pretend that “the science made 
me do it.”  Nor could they suggest the science was done improperly.  
Instead the Presidents’ decisions conceded that the more stringent 
air quality standards were simply too costly.218  The resulting policy 
decisions were exposed for all to see in large part because the 
scientific deliberations were so complete and well documented.  
Ironically, recognizing that there is a close interrelationship 
between science and democracy provides a more explicit and robust 
framework for the scientific and policy basis of decisions. 
Agency staff members may prefer that their recommendations 
be followed, but a rigorous inside-out process ensures that when this 
does not occur, the decision—influenced by politics, courts, and other 
“outside” factors—is made against the backdrop of a professionally 
compiled scientific and policy record.  The role of the agency in this 
way is not so much to identify the answer as to ensure transparency 
in putting that answer in context so that the decision makers can be 
held accountable.  Seen in this way, the role of the Fourth Branch is 
not to govern so much as to use deliberative, public administrative 
processes to inform and hold the decision makers publicly 
responsible for the choices they make. 
CONCLUSION: THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? 
We have sought to explain why the current scholarly and 
institutional vision of American administrative law scholars and 
lawyers has become too narrow.  We are not pursuing some simple 
set of adjustments, but rather we are maintaining that there is 
another way to think about the role and nature of legitimate public 
administration that produces workable models of administrative 
action.  In so doing, we are attempting to open up a new way for 
contemporary scholars to engage with and think about public 
administration, following in the footsteps of early scholars.  
Recognition of the importance of administrative 
constitutionalism also provides greater possibility for addressing the 
current legitimacy issues of public administration.  We are not 
shackled to a model that has been shown to have serious flaws.  
Indeed, as our analysis shows, there is much to learn from history. 
 
 218. See, e.g., Eilperin, supra note 216 (describing the Bush Administration’s 
decision to reject a more stringent particulate standard despite strong scientific 
evidence, including CASAC endorsement, in its favor); Letter from Cass R. 
Sunstein, Adm’r, OIRA, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 2, 2011), available 
at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/EPA_Return_Letter_9-2-2011.pdf 
(returning the ozone standard in part because the President is reluctant to 
“impose significant costs on the private sector or on state, local, or tribal 
governments” during this “economically challenging time”). 
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Overall, we are also not arguing for the replacement of one 
understanding of administrative constitutionalism with another.  
We are arguing for a new stage in administrative law scholarship in 
which there is a commitment to broadening intellectual engagement 
and debate and a willingness to employ multiple models of 
administrative accountability simultaneously.  We liken this to an 
“enlightenment” in which a commitment to reason flourishes, as 
does a simultaneous pursuit of scientific and social inquiry.  In 
saying this, we recognize the complexity of any “enlightenment 
process,”219 but it is exactly that complexity on which administrative 
law scholars should be focusing. 
 
 219. See BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 130–45 (Catherine 
Porter trans., 1993). 
